Hi Andrew, thanks for your feedback.
About the budget: You can put an address on coinbase with P2Pool on BCH from as little as 30 dollars of rented HP. But to do it properly and with several addresses for different participants I would estimate a budget of $1000.
About P2Pool (point 2) I agree.
About the public list of participant addresses: I try to have miners participate directly or delegate % of their hashpower to devs or other actors for them to participate. To achieve the latter, miners must know addresses of participants who wish to participate. I think it is logical and simple for the different dev teams to maintain public lists of these addresses. It is a zero cost action, which will show support and availability of talent for miners to delegate their power to them.
I agree that the comment about NextChain is irrelevant here. We will change the text.
On how to make the TXs to participate… I am waiting for feedback on how I can facilitate this. I don’t know exactly what is needed. The transaction is like memo.cash with a specific address. I didn’t imagine this would be a problem. Obviously I am open to collaborate, but I need the minimum feedback to determine what is needed to facilitate making these TX. I think this is part of the content of the initiative.
About using Trezor, it gives the most comfortable experience. More than enough to prove the concept. I chose Trezor because there can be no risk of massive PK theft by JS injection or similar.
About BMP being incipient: nobody uses it because nobody uses it. The BMP tries to solve a problem that is 90% political and 10% technological. Other miners have privately shown interest to me. But it’s true, in the end no one takes the first step because no one does. But Knuth and 2 other people have already done it.
On that note, Is there any hope that the mining community would actually get involved?
Yes. Zhuoer recommended the use of the BMP in IFPv2. Other miners will readily support it when others do. Recently 90% of the BCH hashpower signaled. I have seen miners try to organize on several occasions (unsuccessfully, but they want to).
And more importantly can BU positively impact participation?
It’s always the same.
Giant miner: “I also want others to decide, not only me”
Big miners: “but why doesn’t someone else start first?”
Medium miners: “but why don’t the big miners use it?”
Small miners: “I’m irrelevant, I can’t impact participation”
Devs: “I’m irrelevant, I can’t impact participation”
Obviously BU can impact participation!
It would be enough if at some point miners discover that there are BU devs saying “hello” with hashpower in a decentralized chat room, and lists of participants who want to participate with delegated HP.
Or are we wasting our time here on a wishful feature? This is why I didn’t spend effort to construct the special voting tx software that was needed to not use a hardware wallet. I don’t see BU as having any influence to encourage miner participation.
Thank you for giving me that feedback now.
At this point does the larger (non-mining) community even WANT the miners to take over decision making authority?
I understand you are talking about BCHN. That’s an interesting question. I’m opening a CHIP just like this one there.
But the whitepaper was not created for a group of central devs to be in power. I’m sure you all agree on this (Well, we’ll have to ask).
In any case, it is in BU’s interest to try something that has such low cost and so little risk.
Finally, I would like to see this fit into the CHIP process. I think that this might fit together well, because the CHIP process doesn’t have a clear yes/no resolution, other than hash power voting. Perhaps the BMP technique fits well there.
The BMP obviously fits into that part of the CHIP.
And I have sent a CHIP to open the discussion.
But there is no way that the BMP should be limited to just being an element within the regulation of a single dev team, when the potential of the BMP is to address the root cause of all the divisions that have occurred due to centralized decision making and allow for a larger, more stable organization by extending the original consensus mechanism.
